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The field of musical aesthetics clearly
depends on the conception of music as an
art: this in turn is connected with the
modern notion of art in general. . . .
Although the arts are even older than the
liberal arts, before the Renaissance they
were devoted more to their use and the
role in social life than to beauty and
expressiveness for their own sake.
Music, among other things, is a form of
activity: a practice. If we take it in these
terms, we should be able to understand it
less as an attempt to say something than
as an attempt to do something. As a
practice, music should be subject to the
same kinds of rigorous interpretations that
we customarily apply to other cultural
practices . . . .[1]
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Abstract
Traditional aesthetic theory has posited an account of music, and the
other arts, as autonomous of social meanings, relevance, and
conditions. In the case of music, “absolute music” is sequestered from
social and other roots that bring music into being in the first place. The
typical claim, thus, is that classical music is music for its own sake,
divorced from the many and highly evident social dimensions that it
serves. It ignores all other genres of music, most of which are more
appreciated than can be accounted for by the theory of autonomania.
This aesthetic theory of music, one of many theories, is unconvincing in
history, and discourse of the broader philosophy of music, and a praxial
theory of music is offered here in contradiction. The implications for
music education should be clear, that the autonomy of music and music
education from society is a troublesome and misleading contention.
Key Words
absolute music, aesthetics, music, philosophy of music, praxis, praxial
music education

1. Autonomania
From the beginning of human time, the role of music was thoroughly
praxial; a social practice in which various uses of music and music of
many kinds were vital to the experience and conduct of daily life. Thus it
was not contemplated in rarefied moments of leisure. Rather, as John
Dewey wrote in Art as Experience, music and the other arts “were
enhancements of the processes of everyday life” and thus “had no
peculiar connection with theaters, galleries, museums [or concert halls].
They were part of the significant life of an organized community.” The
modernist “museum conception of art,” as Dewey called it, and the
concert hall as “the museum of imaginary musical works” are both, for
Dewey, the result of certain “extraneous conditions” that have given rise
to “theories which isolate art and its appreciation by placing them in a
realm of their own, disconnected from other modes of
experiencing.”[2],[3],[4] Aaron Ridley, in The Philosophy of Music (2004),
characterizes this syndrome of compartmentalizing music from its social
roots and contexts of praxis as autonomania.[5]
There is something very odd, after all, about the way in
which so much philosophy of music has so often been
done. To try to isolate music entirely, to try to leech or
prise out of it its context-laden character, and indeed the
very nature of one’s own context-laden engagement with
it, is rather like trying to pretend that music had come
from Mars—that it has suddenly appeared on one’s desk
from nowhere, a perfectly formed but wholly mysterious
phenomenon of which one knew precisely nothing.
Which, as I say, is odd, given how far from the truth that
picture is.[6]
Before the "gulf" or "chasm"[7] that had isolated art into an putatively
autonomous realm of its own according to speculative rational claims for
a unique ontology of experience that is thoroughly distanced from, that
is, not just different from but somehow elevated above, the experiences
of daily life, music was central to and was experienced as religion,
ceremony, celebration, ritual, dance, politics, recreation, self-expression,
personal praxis, and a host of other praxies too ubiquitous to list here.[8]

[Until] the final years of the eighteenth century all music
remained bound to the functions [that] today we call
occasional music. Judged according to its social function,
it served to enhance the sanctity and dignity of worship,
the glamour of the festivities at court, and the overall
splendor of ceremony.[9]
Considered as praxis, religious music, for example, is not simply music
used in a worship service as a momentary respite from or mere
adornment of ritual and sermonizing. Praxially, it is worship, a type of
prayer and an essential part of the religious ceremony. In the same ways
that dance is inseparable from its music, religious music is not
something added but instead is central to religious praxis.
This is also the case for all other forms of musical praxis. Music is
fundamental to each socio-musical doing (praxis) that brings it into being
to begin with and not simply an accompaniment that can be eliminated
without significantly influencing the nature and experience of the event.
As anthropologist Ellen Dissanayake has persuasively demonstrated,
music is key to “making special” the many personal and social practices
that have led to its creation and performance and that continue to invite
its use.[10] Without the music, such occasions are radically altered and
something vitally significant is lost. Consider, for example, a wedding
without music. In other words, music exists to meet the many human
needs and benefits that it was originally created to serve. The very
existence of this or that music is evidence of its praxial relevance to
humans being human. As with other aspects of human’s creating
meaning, there would be no music or art if it didn’t serve the interests
that brought it into being in the first place.
In fact, music is so aligned with its various praxial uses that music, as a
noun, is now understood as the totality of the activity by which people,
individually and collaboratively, explore, define, celebrate, and intertwine
their social identities, not just the organized sound-forms of the moment,
as is conventionally understood. In the praxial view, the sociality of the
entire occasion is the music. Thus, properly and profoundly, Small
coined the gerund “musicking” to stress this socially dynamic and holistic
role for music, against music as a noun, as though an autonomous
thing.[11]
The act of musicking establishes in the place where it is
happening a set of relationships, and it is in those
relationships that the meaning of the act lies. They are to
be found not only between those organized sounds which
are conventionally thought of as being the stuff of musical
meaning but also between the people who are taking
part, in whatever capacity, in the performance; and they
model, or stand as metaphor for, ideal relationships as
the participants in the performance imagine them to be:
relationships between person and person, between
individual and society, between humanity and the natural
world and even perhaps the supernatural world.[12]
The resulting sociality is no less true of Western classical music than of
any other musics.[13] In particular, the rise of the public concert in the
eighteenth century was “a musical performance that clearly
distinguishes between performers and audience and that admits an
anonymous public upon payment of an entrance fee,”[14] and involves a
social history closely wed to the rise of the middle class.[15] Chopin
resisted the temptation for public adoration in favor of more private and
intimate aristocratic audiences with whom he felt he could communicate:
“Concerts never create real music, they are a form which one has to
renounce in order to be able to hear what is most beautiful in art”
because he “could not communicate with an indiscriminate audience . .
.” in comparison to the salons of chamber musicing to which he was
therefore attracted increasingly.[16] This set him apart from his
contemporary and friend Liszt, who, we learn from history, had the
opposite ethos. Glory and showmanship were his ideal. Yet, he
considered Chopin to be his superior as an artist.
The social nature of such concerts and, later, solo recitals is less noted
because of the rites of concert etiquette, the requirements of silent and
solemn social demeanor that, as a result of what might be called
audience training, were central in the sacralization of music and the
other arts into the quasi-religious, almost sacred experience[17] that
Shiner calls “the apotheosis of art,” with art becoming spiritually
“redemptive” for audiences and a “sacred calling” for artists.[18],[19] “As
music was sacralized and placed on an altar, so were its creators
elevated to become high priests of this secularized religion.” Thus, under
the aegis of this “sacral purpose,”[20] for music,
composers have an aura of divinely inspired genius,
virtuosi are worshiped as gods on earth, and a reverential
faith in the mysteries of aesthetic claims for music give it
a certain cult-like sanctity. Music theory becomes
theology, the score a holy text, the concert a ceremony,

the performer the high priest, and the congregation of
audience members seeks cultural salvation from the base
temptations of praxial and easily accessible musics. It is
not surprising, then, that we think music is some special,
almost holy deliverance from the spirit world.[21]
As part of this process of the social transformation of music into a sacred
realm, champions of so-called high culture, typically representatives of
good taste from the upper, wealthy, “classy” echelons of society, felt their
social responsibility was not merely to transform “the audiences in the
opera houses, theaters, symphonic halls, museums, and parks” . . . , it
was the entire society” that needed such cultivation.[22],[23] These
patrons of the arts “were convinced that maintaining and disseminating
pure art, music, literature, and drama” provided for “the higher wants of
civilized life” needed to morally educate the working classes. [24] Thus,
once artistic canons had been established
that identified the legitimate forms of drama, music, and
art and the valid modes of performing and displaying
them, the arbiters of culture turned their attention to
establishing appropriate means of receiving culture. The
authority that they first established over theaters, actors,
orchestras, musicians, and art museums, they now
extended to the audience. Their general success in
disciplining and training audiences constitutes one of
those cultural transformations that have been almost
totally ignored by historians.[25]
That these forms of the arts have been legitimatized, as opposed to
others, has itself been the result of interlocking ideological, social,
economic, and political processes, practices, and contexts that decidedly
influenced the resources locally available to artists, and, in the case of
music, musical instruments, and that result in music and arts of different
peoples and ages are recognizably distinct.
As a result of the many and significant and supposedly extra-musical
variables, most of which are intentionally left out of conventional histories
of music, attending concerts and recitals of classical music is a
thoroughgoing social act that is no less dependent on and as
comprehensively imbued with sociality and social relationships as any
other socio-cultural custom. The semiotics of the space of a concert hall
or art gallery, for example, are thus implicated in the social meanings
experienced there.[26]
A church, for example, is associated with certain religious
texts as well as with different ceremonies and rituals
performed by people coming to the place and behaving in
appropriate ways. An art gallery or a concert hall is
interpreted to be not only a specific place for exhibiting
and performing works of art but also a place associated
with various cultural practices, conventions and
conceptions, . . . Museums and galleries are the places
where paintings and other objects can be experienced in
an impersonal environment not too closely connected to
the pleasures and sorrows of practical, everyday life.
Similarly, musical scholarship suggests that the idea of
concert halls as places where musical ‘works’ could be
completed [sic; contemplated?] apart from everyday
matters developed along the same lines and for the same
reasons as museums and galleries. In this way the
environment can be seen as a system of signs, a sort of
spatial code, interpreted with linguistic and other
meaningful practices.[27]
Thus the semiotic meanings of concert halls as places for contemplating
music apart from everyday uses are thoroughly implicated in the many
“socially constructed meanings” experienced there.[28]
Musical meaning does not exist objectively in the work—
or even in its composer’s intentions. It resides in the
particular moment of reception, one shaped by dominant
aesthetic [viz., taste publics] and social expectations that
are themselves historically structured. ... Beyond the
particular negotiation between the listener and the music,
it also implies a performance space, with its own
particular personality, and a unique historical moment,
with its styles of expression and political preoccupations.
All public expression of musical response—even silence
—is inevitably social. Public expression, although freely
chosen, is drawn from a finite number of behaviors and
styles of discourse shaped by the culture.[29]
Thus, hearing religious choral music in a concert hall and in a church
used as a concert venue can have considerably different meanings as a
result of the social practices, behaviors, meanings, and semiotic
significations attached to or associated with these quite different spaces
and their usual purposes. In general, moving religious music to the

concert hall has secularized it, thus helping create the misimpression of
its autonomy as purely music. Similarly, hearing jazz performed on a
proscenium or concert stage. as a concert, with formal audience
demeanor, or in a church as a concert venue, seated in pews, and
surrounded by religious artifacts and symbols, leads to a quite different
socio-musical experience than experiencing it in the informal
atmosphere of a club or pub. Johnson, for example, argues,
that we value music for what it does for us and that our
musical choices reflect these values. Individually, we
often make different musical choices in different social
contexts, because we expect music to fulfill a range of
functions for us in those contexts. Our judgment about
the same piece of music can change completely
depending on its context.[30]
Accordingly, sociologists of music study and account for the important
social contexts and functions of music typically overlooked or studiously
ignored by music theorists and traditional musicologists, as do cultural
theorists and cultural historians.[31],[32],[33] As one music historian
writes, “on the largest scale, structures of society—monarchical,
aristocratic, meritocratic, democratic—produce patterns of behavior that
underlie everyday interactions”—patterns that can “influence how the
music is heard.”[34] Indeed, social psychologists of music empirically
confirm that “everyday listening contexts can influence responses to
music, and music can influence responses to everyday listening
contexts.”[35] As a result, the reception and meaning of music cannot be
studied in a sociocultural vacuum, devoid of the details of a praxis as
proposed by the leading partisans of autonomania: music theorists,
traditional musicologists and, of course aestheticians and aesthetes.
Scholars in other disciplines also increasingly point to particular socially
constructed meanings in relation to music and its various practices. For
example, music in connection with ethnicity and identity, gender, race;
and participatory values provide comparative ethnomusicological studies
of “music as social life.” [36],[37] And under the heading of “musicking
the world,” social psychologist Benzon explains music as, for example,
“coupled sociality,” ritual, a source of healing, and as a primary source of
cultural cohesion, all of which involve the mind attuning itself socially and
affectively to others through music. [38]
All such socially constructed and influenced meanings are also
implicated even while listening to recordings, alone or with others. In
fact, the very existence of recordings and their various uses are also
distinct musical practices and offer “good-fors” and key types of sociality
that are not available in connection with live music. For example,
recordings have facilitated the creation of “taste publics and taste
cultures,” and have led to personally recorded play-lists and sound
tracks, the use of music in various commercial contexts, like film, TV,
and advertising, the creation of “mass art,” the “social uses of
background music for personal enhancement,” and musical filesharing, collecting, and audiophile interests.[39],[40],[41] And, to be
sure, mobile listening, wherever one might be, seems to be taking
command, though what is being listened to and to what effect remains
unknown.
2. Against autonomania
Contrary to the claims of orthodox rationalist-speculative aesthetics that
music’s connection with such functions and meanings somehow
demeans its value is the empirical evidence from, for example,
sociology, anthropology, cultural psychology, ethnomusicology, cultural
history, and so on, of music’s absolutely central, and pivotal praxial role
in social and cultural life, and that without it, the events in which it plays
such a consequential role would be so radically altered that daily life
would become “humdrum,” as Dewey stated.[42] Thus, “there is nothing
‘natural’ or self-evident about the aesthetic claim that music is
autonomous: there had been music for centuries before anyone got
round to having the idea, and there is no reason at all to suppose that
every piece of responsible thinking about music must be conducted in its
terms.”[43]
The historical and empirical evidence of music’s praxial importance and
value is abundantly clear. “[M]usic is inevitably a social practice.”[44]
Likewise, discussions, including music criticism but also the dialog and
jargon of musicians and the informal commentary of non-musicians and
critics, and analyses of music, including scholarship like the philosophy
of music, are also conditioned by an endless variety of central and
continually shifting social categories that make music and discourse
about it interdependent.
So definitely have both the repertoire and the discourse
of German-speaking Europe in the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries shaped our own sense of what
a culture of art music is, that perhaps only recently, as
other forms of musical expression have begun to undergo
long-overdue study, have we been able to recognize the

impact of this culture and study it rather than frame our
studies under its influence.[45]
Overlooked by autonomania, then, is that discourse about music,
whether aesthetic, philosophical, or journalistic, is itself decidedly social
in its origins and audiences and has and continues to have an
inescapable impact on the reception and status of music in society and
culture.
The economic and historical influences that led to the sacralization and
aestheticizing of the arts and to the theory of music’s autonomy from its
praxial contributions to daily life and culture have continued to the
present.[46] That account begins with the Renaissance and its
precedents in ancient Greece, and the subsequent evolution of thought
about music and the arts that led, during the Enlightenment, and
particularly in German philosophy and other arts discourse, to the rise of
aesthetics and to the creation of the concept of fine art as asocial and
autonomous.[47] The plentiful evidence from history and various cultural
studies provides a deconstruction of the aesthetic ideology, the grand
narrative or totalizing discourse of aesthetics that supports various
bourgeois ideological influences, and the power they have held over
other accounts of musical value in the over 250 years or so since the
invention of aesthetic theory. However, unlike typical postmodern
deconstruction, this unpacking of analytic aesthetics sets the stage for
an alternate, praxial account of music and musical value.
3. The aestheticizing of musical praxis
Among the “historic reasons for the rise of the compartmental conception
of fine art” are the various philosophical precedents from Plato and
Aristotle that began to be applied to the arts in the mid-fifteenth to
sixteenth centuries, the period in cultural and intellectual history known
as the Renaissance. The age was characterized by a revival, a so-called
re-birth (from the Latin renascens, “to be born again”), of classical Greek
learning that replaced the religious sobriety and scholastic philosophy of
the late Middle Ages in favor of a humanist ideal of the full development
and flourishing of individual potentiality. For such humanism, “man is the
measure of all things,”[48] and thus
that each man is a measure for himself. The tag word is
“individualism”—these men [sic] were great individualists
as opposed to the timid conformists of the monkish
Middle Ages; they were men who dared to be
themselves, because they trusted in their own natural
power, in something inside themselves.[49]
As a result, people increasingly started to think of themselves as more
fully responsible for their own accomplishments and destinies.
With this resurgence of emphasis on human worth and dignity, the idea
of the individual as a highly individual, cerebral, and atomic self slowly
gained credence.[50] Renaissance artists, authors, and composers no
longer labored as anonymous artisans and began taking personal credit
for their creations by signing them. All of the arts of the time, however,
continued to be praxial, in that they continued to be intimately connected
with the Roman Church, and, following the Protestant Reformation, with
most of the Protestant and Orthodox denominations, and with advancing
the social, political, and economic interests and status of the royalty. In
fact, the Renaissance music recounted in today’s music history books
was so inextricably wed to its critical role in both religion and the lives of
the courtiers and aristocracy that “the average person scarcely had any
opportunity to hear music except in church or noble society.”[51] As
medieval polyphony, with its multiple voices singing the same or
sometimes different texts gave way to homophony, texts became more
comprehensible and the music could be wed to textual meaning and the
affective impact calculated. This trend was central to the beginnings of
opera, itself a result of the attempt to recreate what the Camerata, an
influential group of Renaissance musicians, noblemen, and antiquarian
intellectuals, (mis)believed to be the expressive power of music in
ancient Greek drama.
In addition, the courtly love of the Middle Ages, as recounted in the
troubadour songs of the time, predicated on the ideal of a knight serving
his courtly lady, evolved into the typically sentimental love themes of
Renaissance madrigals under the influence of the Neo-Platonist concept
of Platonic Love advanced by Marsilo Ficcino, the leader of the Platonic
Academy of Florence.[52] This music helped the social development of
our modern concept of romantic love, a relatively new idea, one that was
also tied to the evolving concept of the individual and the states of mind
experienced by individuals.
Similarly, there was new interest in nature as a result of the reappraisal
of Aristotle’s writings, whose realism took an active interest in the
external world and thus acknowledged empirical knowledge gained via
the senses. Important roots in the history of science also stem from this
period, for example, in the works of Andreas Vesalius, Nicolaus
Copernicus, Galileo Galilei, and Francis Bacon. Artists then began to

include nature as an important subject of its own, not just as a
background for religious themes or portraits of important figures, and
themes from nature also entered the madrigal literature, including in the
new solo madrigal of the seventeenth century, and, along with love,
eventually became a staple of the canon of art song, canozone, and lied.
Aside from the important fact that such music depends on words that
unavoidably have extra-musical and thus social meaning, the rise of
focus on the individual increasingly led to states of mind that
experienced both the themes of love and nature in new and important
arts-related ways.[53] The very topic of love is social in essence and
effect.
In particular, certain psychological language regarding expressive or
affective aspects of an individual’s artistic experience increasingly came
into use, in addition to the ongoing recognition of the praxial nature of the
arts.[54],[55] Thus, by the late Renaissance, the idea of the fine arts
began to take shape and “the art of music began to free itself from any
rigid or absolute social function,” as musicologist Charles Rosen
approvingly describes the beginnings of the aestheticizing of music as
an emancipation from the supposedly prosaic life lived more fully
through music.[56],[57]
By the eighteenth century, intellectual currents in Europe associated
with the Zeitgeist of the Enlightenment, particularly in Germany but also
in France, coalesced the long history of philosophical theorizing about
music, an intellectual history that is altogether distinct from the praxial
purposes actually served by music throughout history, into an aesthetic
theory of the fine arts that sought not only to replace the universal
praxialism of previous centuries but to altogether reject it.[58],[59]
Importantly, “the concept of musical autonomy became voguish at
precisely the point and for many of the reasons that art as a whole was
increasingly being rethought (i.e., that the fine arts were being
Romanticized [in the 19th century])” in purely aesthetic terms.[60]
Notice, for example, that Rosen, quoted above, writes that music had to
“free itself” from, what, the burden its many praxial functions?—as
though these social conditions and functions that occasion music in the
first place were somehow impure, debasing, or limiting.
Thus arises the idea of music as “immaculate, disembodied and cut off
from the rest of the world,” from the social practices in which music is
always rooted, and the conception of music as thoroughly, and properly,
divorced from the extra-musical relations, contexts, and functions that
always have characterized it.[61] It is known today as absolute music,
although what its absolutism consists of is neither apparent nor
convincing.
Once one has decided that pieces of music are most
illuminatingly to be seen as pure sound-structures,
disembodied and self-sufficient, very few options remain.
One is obliged either to deny that these alleged extramusical relations are real; or to admit that they’re real,
but to deny that they’re important; or, darkly suspecting
them to be both real and important, one is obliged to
square the circle and show how something can be
essentially related to the world at the same time as it is
essentially autonomous. And these alternatives have
indeed absorbed a non-negligible proportion of the
philosophical energies that music has attracted, with
expectedly drab results.[62]
The rise of this autonomania was directly abetted by the rationalism the
eighteenth-century Enlightenment inherited from the seventeenth
century. Yet in its zeal for advancing the new scientific method, the
Enlightenment also championed empiricism, which naturally contradicts
rationalism by asserting that sensory experience (aisthesis), not reason
(rationality), is the source of truth and knowledge. Aesthetic theorizing
has since struggled mightily to reconcile the sensory and affective bases
of artistic responding with the supposed faculty of reason venerated by
Enlightenment philosophers and philosophes.
Traditional musicologists and music theorists have claimed to follow a
scientific (positivist) model in their study of music. Since “a scientifically
objective finding” is “maximally independent of the vagaries of time and
place, . . . and, above all, of what one might term the human element—
prejudices, feelings, wants, needs,” they have attempted to account
rationally for musical works as though free-standing stimulus objects that
carry intrinsic and thus timeless, placeless, and faceless aesthetic
meanings, values, and truths.[63]
This objectification of musical “works” was originally given impetus early
in the Renaissance by the invention in 1501 of music printing.[64]
The expansion of commercial music printing for a
growing market of amateur performers fundamentally
altered the way music was conceived. Prior to that, the
performances would have been thought of primarily as
music making—as a social practice [praxis] attached to

social gatherings . . . . Since many musicians played or
directed performances of their works, music had a very
limited life beyond live performance. The widespread
printing of sheet music and musical scores allowed music
to become a tangible object [a ‘work’] like a book and thus
a commodity whose use extended far beyond the sway of
the composer.[65]
In the debates inherited from the Greeks, of particular interest for the
arts, and for the history of science, have been the continuous attempts of
philosophers to account rationally for knowledge gained through the
senses, the original Greek meaning of the term aisthesis from which
aesthetics had been mistakenly derived. Differences between Aristotle
and Plato on this topic were decisive. “For Aristotle, aisthesis was not a
form of episteme or intellectual knowledge (in this, he followed Plato),
but it did nonetheless involve a judgment of sense.” However, unlike
Plato, who notoriously distrusted the senses, Aristotle did attribute “an
independent non-intellectual cognitive value to the senses.”[66] To
account for this non-intellectual but nonetheless important and often
striking cognitive knowledge provided by the senses, neo-Aristotelian
thinkers hypothesized various theories of common sense that proposed
internal organs or sixth-sense faculties by which the diverse and
supposedly inchoate input of the senses was synthesized for further
rational judgment.[67]
However, aisthesis, as the judgment of the senses, was not accorded
fully rational or trustworthy status, in large part because it dwelled on the
unique particulars of an individual’s sensory experience rather than on
the abstract universals that the supposedly higher faculty of reason was
believed to reveal.[68] Ideas concerning a synthesizing “common sense
survived and flourished” and served as “the intuitive bases of
Enlightenment rationalism” and for subsequent rationalist claims in
support of a view from nowhere reachable by pure, socially disembodied
and subjectively detached reason.[69],[70] Nonetheless, the
psychological language of inward sensibility that had accompanied
discussions of aisthesis since Plato and Aristotle was increasingly used
in reference to art and music, and eventually led to the concept of a taste
for beauty that would be enshrined in post-Kantian and analytic aesthetic
theory as the aesthetic theory of art, one among other theories of art.[71]
In particular, it led to the attempts of German philosopher Alexander
Baumgarten’s attempt to legitimate judgments of sense regarding art in
terms more favorable to the prevailing rationalism of the Enlightenment.
However, Baumgarten’s first and groundbreaking treatise deals entirely
with poetry.[72] Of this, Osborne observes: “It is ironic . . . that both the
philosophical concept of aesthetics (in Baumgarten) and the modern
philosophical concept of art (in the early German Romantics) should
have been based on the generalization of a literary model” to all the
arts.[73] Thus, following his Aesthetica of 1750, Baumgarten’s original
claims for poetry were indiscriminately applied to the other arts, despite
the obviously major differences in media and artistic praxis, gave the
new philosophical discipline its name, and provided the philosophical
and rational foundations for the concept of fine art that survives to this
day.
In his treatise, Baumgarten worried that “sensate representations,” as he
called the sensations resulting from aisthesis, “were representations
received through the lower part of the cognitive faculty,” and thus were
“confused.”[74] From the Greeks to the Enlightenment, in attempting to
reconcile the particulars revealed by sense with the universals reached
by reason,
the movement of thought was always assumed to be
upward, at once toward the mental [i.e., rational] and the
more real. The “confused” as the merely sensed was
also potentially intelligible, and was at the bottom of the
ladder of human knowledge. From such a standpoint the
“confused” world was literally inarticulate, awaiting
translation to a plane of a truer distinctness.[75]
Baumgarten’s “new science of aesthetics” thus, “was to be to sensuous
knowledge, or to the lower part of the cognitive faculty, as logic is to
intellectual knowledge,” that is, “his ‘aesthetics’ was thus a science of
the ‘perfection of sense,’ to be achieved by the analysis of what pleased
and displeased sense.”[76]
In inventing the term “aesthetic” (aesthetica in the Latin)
to denote the science of sensory knowledge of beauty
—“perfection of sense”—Baumgarten was deploying a
broadly Aristotelian conception of aisthesis to counter the
shortcomings of the Platonic inheritance of Leibnizian
rationalism in matters of taste: its derogatory, or at best
contradictory estimation of the senses.[77]
Baumgarten’s intent, then, was to make the “prerational sensate
judgment” of aisthesis more “distinct,” or clear, and thus more
acceptably rational to those in the tradition of Plato, who continued to

distrust the senses.[78] Nonetheless, following the influence of
seventeenth-century arch-rationalist Leibniz, who staunchly maintained
the separation of mind and body, in the hands of the Enlightenment
philosophers such “distinctness thus presupposes analysis and
definition.”[79]
In line with the Enlightenment’s paradigm that to know is to analyze,
define, and label, the discourse of traditional aesthetics, other
disciplines, and art and music critics thus increasingly rationalized the
arts.[80],[81] Accordingly, the idea of appreciating the arts was made
dependent on intellectual analysis, dissection, autonomania, and
analysis of works (viz., scores) as though they were scientific objects
that needed detailed study, even dissection, in order to be known. This
led directly to
the rise of a new, positivist style of musical analysis, one
that could “claim to be ‘enlightened’ and therefore
uninfluenced by ‘external’—sociological, political, and
historical—considerations." Once it had been decided that
pieces of music were essentially autonomous structures
of sound, after all, it seemed evident that the analysis of
those structures would reveal the innermost truths about
music; and it seemed, moreover, that if one got one’s
analysis right, those truths should be demonstrable.[82]
As a result, such analysis was of musical works as pure and
autonomous sound structures and, in consequence, of strictly internal
and supposedly intrinsic features and relations. Consequently,
appreciation was seen as a matter of the cognitive and intellectual
understanding of works in rational terms that must be studied, learned,
and refined. “Culture required training” and thus proper comprehension
and the necessary background knowledge depended on a regimen of
connoisseurship required to develop refined and discriminating taste.[83]
The social connection with fine art and refinement was made
abundantly clear, and the relation between high culture and cultivation
(even cult) was solidified.
Despite Baumgarten’s attempts to make aisthesic sensibility more
rational, the Cartesian mind-body split and the inherent contradictions
between rationalism and empiricism were not resolved by the new
aesthetic theory proposed by Baumgarten.[84],[85] In fact, from the very
beginning, controversy and inconsistency reigned. To start with, Kant
quickly “rejected Baumgarten’s notion of a pure sensory knowledge.”[86]
Thus, “declarations of the impropriety of the word ‘aesthetic’
accompanied the rise of aesthetic thought itself. The aesthetic regime of
thought did not begin with the book by Baumgarten that invented
aesthetics. . . . It began with Kant’s little note challenging that
invention.”[87]
This “little note” is Kant’s footnote to his 1787Critique of Pure Reason:
The Germans are the only people who currently make
use of the word ‘aesthetic’ to signify what others call the
critique of taste. This usage originated in the abortive
attempt made by Baumgarten . . . to bring the critical
treatment of the beautiful under rational principles, and so
to raise its rules to the rank of a science. But such
endeavors are fruitless.[88]
Nonetheless, thereafter, among German philosophers, the word
“aesthetics”
was more precisely defined in August W. Schlegel’s
Lessons in Aesthetics, which open with the assertion that
it is time to get rid of this notion of aesthetics, a veritable
qualitas occulta. It was stabilized in Hegel’s Lectures on
Aesthetics, which rapidly tabled the question: The word
“aesthetics,” Hegel said, is improper to designate the
philosophy of beautiful art. But usage has imposed the
word and it can be adopted, he continues, on the
condition that one recognizes that the concept of the
beautiful is exactly the opposite of what is expressed by
the word aesthetics.[89]
However, by 1790, forty years after Baumgarten’s Aesthetica, “Kant
radically altered his skeptical view of aesthetics as a philosophical
discipline” and, as a lesser part of his overall Critique of Judgment, his
theory of free and universal judgments of beauty and the sublime were
mistakenly turned by aesthetic philosophers into an aesthetic theory of
art.[90],[91] “[N]amely, that works of art are things that have been
designed for the purpose of bringing about aesthetic responses of the
sort characterized in Kant’s theory of (free) beauty.”[92] In fact, Kant
found art to be inferior to natural beauty because nature is free of human
impurities.[93] He thought that wallpaper using nature themes was
beautiful.
Accordingly, “Kant’s theory is not a theory of art” but an analysis of “free

(rather than ‘dependent’) beauty,” in particular judgments about beauty
in nature.[94] In his analysis
Kant wants to offer an account of the way in which such
judgements can be universal and necessary even though
they are based solely on our subjective feeling of
pleasure when we see something like a stunning sunset.
Put crudely, Kant wants to explain how, on the basis of
my subjective experience alone, I can justifiably expect
everyone else to assent to my judgement that ‘this sunset
is beautiful.’[95]
“To this end, Kant develops and elaborates a theory of authentic
judgements of taste” that distinguishes between “the ‘agreeable arts’ of
amusement that serve purposes of distraction and entertainment, and
the ‘fine arts’ which are their own purpose.”[96] Thus was established
the disdain for entertainment in connection with the fine arts that has
since existed in aesthetic theorizing and classical music circles. For
Kant, again, the “purposiveness without purpose” that distanced the
“agreeable arts” from the “fine arts” depends on “disinterestedness” as a
condition of the what later aestheticians consider to be the “aesthetic
attitude” one should bring to works of art:[97],[98]
That our state of mind is disinterested—unconcerned with
the practical consequences, advantages, disadvantages,
and purport of the objects of attention—is thought to
factor out all those interests in the object that might be
suspected of making us judge the object differently from
others. Thus the judgement is made on the basis of what
everyone has in common . . . without the interference of
any idiosyncratic interests (such as practical or political
utility, the prospect of personal gain, etc.) that might skew
our judgement.[99]
This notion of an aesthetic attitude of disinterestedness was transformed
by subsequent philosophers and art critics “into the idea that the work of
art itself is autonomous, i.e., independent of ulterior cognitive and/or
utilitarian purposes. And, of course, these two views can be connected
by suggesting that it is the absence of utilitarian [viz., praxial] concerns in
the object that is conducive to our disinterested response to it.”[100] The
resulting conclusion is that any such praxial concerns, including
entertainment values, introduce subjective pleasures and interests and
other practically “dependent” or merely “agreeable” variables into what
should be a pure and purifying aesthetic experience.
Meanwhile, Kant’s theory of disinterested judgments of pure beauty, the
staple paradigm of aesthetics became “the definitive Enlightenment
version of orthodox ‘aesthetics’, revolving around an ideal of pure
contemplation distinguished from and raised above sensory pleasure”
and praxis and, as has been mentioned already, was rendered into a
mistaken aesthetic theory of art that has continued to be promulgated,
and supposedly clarified, by various strains of analytic aesthetics,
countless monographs, and shelves of reference books (obscurum per
obscuris?).[101] From this point in history, art was no longer in the
service of the activities of daily life but was said to exist to create a
rarefied and unique experience of its own to be savored on rare and
special occasions that thereby are thought to be raised above the
mundane world and are thus elevating. In consequence, “released from
its functions . . . , art became an object of free choice and of changing
preference,” thus rapidly creating a new taste public for the
contemplation of works of art and music, the latter through the new
institution of the public concert and the corresponding invention of
classical music as we know it today.[102],[103]
The practice of contemplating music as though for its own sake was
decidedly advanced by the developing institution of the public concert, or
vice versa. Music quickly became a bourgeois “commodity, a package of
culture to be acquired through sheet music and concert-going.”[104]
With the rise of this new market for music, the number of concerts grew
rapidly and the consequent competition for audiences created a need to
advertise. As the public gained access to “culture” in concert halls,
theaters, and museums, journals of art and cultural criticism began to
appear in large numbers in the public sphere.[105] Through these and
the proliferation of aesthetic writings by philosophers in the nineteenth
century, most of whom felt obliged to have a section on aesthetics as
part of their comprehensive theory, the new aesthetic orthodoxy of the
time “established a specious science of ‘taste,’ which still underpins all
our institutionalized and habitual thought on the subjects of art and
beauty.”[106]
The disinterestedness at the heart of the aesthetic attitude’ thus fueled
the “art for art’s sake” view of musical value that diverted attention from
the many praxial functions and values of music described above. As a
result, “that art objects properly so called are designed in such a way as
to promote intellectually engaged, contemplative participation” has
become the keynote of much orthodox aesthetic theory, especially with
regards to the idea of music being for its own sake.[107]

4. Conclusions for education
The social and cultural history presented here concerning autonomania
strongly urges a rejection of the claim of autonomy. Music and art exist
and continue to be vital to the lives of millions around the world because
of their praxial benefits, and their contribution to living the good life.
Relying on the theory that music is autonomous of social contexts is a
predictable way of turning off its relevance to students and much of
society. The speculative arguments for autonomania might contribute to
the scholarly status of aestheticians in the ivory tower but, when applied
to the praxis of music education, they have had decidedly negative
consequences for its status and intended benefits. Music adrift from lived
meanings and sociocultural contexts is especially not congenial to
children and adolescents, or their parents, or to the institutional
conditions of schooling.
In particular, it has led to the problem that school music education itself
is also too typically autonomous from the rest of the music world,
especially the adult music world. Despite the prevalence of school music
ensembles, participation seems to be more as a school activity, an
interest that clearly doesn’t last beyond graduation and best used before
the end of schooling. The typical school music literature has been
critiqued, especially by aesthetes, as lightweight and not providing
lasting aesthetic benefits for students.[108]
Music education in schools is thus too typically autonomous of the music
going on in life around us. Its own autonomania often ignores what most
concerns people who love music, which is its relevance to their lives,
where appreciation is seen pragmatically in how and how often
musicking is included in their lives. School music proceeds with its
concerts, competitions, marching bands, show choirs, and other
institutionalized formats to the greater local glory of the directors, with
typically no transfer of meaning or affection to the lives of graduates. The
teacher may be praised but, depending on the country and curriculum,
those teaching music are not always competent musicians.[109] Yet
music teachers, for good reasons, attempt to provide a different door to
the world of music, apart from the evident role it already plays in
students’ lives. But their efforts are too often in vain, including individual
or private music lessons, as regards making an effective difference in
the lives of students, already smothered by musics in the media and by
other attractions for their time.
As a result, music education in schools and private studios often has
little or no lasting impact on students or society. In fact, aesthetes and
connoisseurs are the first to complain about the lowly status of the
public’s tastes. The autonomy of school music and its literature and
practices clearly have not convinced many taxpayers and educational
officials of its value, thus leading to a worrisome lack of financial and
administrative support. Which is very unfortunate, since music is so
important to society. It is, perhaps following only language, a major
variable in constituting contemporary sociocultural life.
The autonomania in music theory, history, and music education is, thus,
counterproductive and self-defeating. Declining and graying audiences
are the result. Schools should instead approach music as a living praxis
according to the opposite theory, that music is a very profound medium
of social meaning, cohesiveness, identity, and harmony. Why deny that
in favor of abstract and speculative autonomania? A praxial theory of
music education, that is, music as “doing” music, musicking, in any of its
many instantiations, will, instead, cement the role of music as an
absolutely major variable in society.
This is, of course, not what is projected by pedagogical theories
predicated on aesthetic autonomy or by standard practices of music
education in many countries, especially since the music theory and
history studies of many music teachers only incline them to
autonomania. Music is and has always been a social praxis the value of
which is the many social uses that it serves, everything from social
dancing, to religious uses, to ethnic and national solidarity, and as a
major ingredient in social gatherings of all kinds! Against the aesthetics
of musical autonomania, human engagement with the role of music in
life has a decided advantage. Autonomania clearly has already lost the
debate of whether music is connected to life rather than arriving from
Mars. Yet music education seems too often to be formally committed to
autonomania and, in fact, is losing ground regularly to music as we know
it in society. Music education ought to instead be, based on the musics
and musicking encountered in the world around us, and for its relevance
throughout life to the life well-lived.
Autonomania has no pragmatic ground to stand on and is clearly losing
the increasing struggle for a place for music in the curriculum. Music
educators, and aestheticians, might well consult the literature cited here
in reconsidering the importance and virtue of musica practica. “[L]ike
every art-form, music is a site where as well as the dialogue of individual
voices, competing ideologies engage in battle to express themselves,
often through a kind of artistic guerilla warfare. But this is largely

obscured by the dominant modes of public [and much scholarly]
discussion of music, which fail to see the links between music and
society.” [110]
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